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ABSTRACT
All government agencies charged with the responsibility of estimating distributional
effects use annual income to classify households and one year's tax to characterize tax burdens.
In this paper, we describe an alternative procedure to estimate lifetime tax burdens as proportions
of lifetime income. To illustrate this model, we calculate lifetime effects of a uniform
consumption tax and a wage tax. This kind of analysis can supplement existing annual analyses,
since policymakers might want to insure both that current taxes reflect current ability to pay and
that lifetime taxes reflect lifetime ability to pay.
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[.1NTRODUCTION
Recent analyses of tax reforms have placed growing emphasis on determining the
distributional effects of policies. Other papers in this volume address various issues concerning
the distributional tables used by all government agencies charged with the responsibility of
measuring distributional effects of taxes. As discussed in these papers, agencies disagree about
the unit of analysis, the measurement of income, tax incidence assumptions, and treatment of
behavioral effects. In measuring both burdens and abilities to pay, however, all of the agencies
adopt a relatively short-run time horizon despite a recent emphasis in the academic literature on
lifetime measures. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has sometimes conducted analyses
using consumption as a proxy for long-mn income, and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT)
has recently adopted a 5-year horizon for their calculations, but none of the agencies have
embraced a full lifetime horizon. Categorizatiçrn of households strictly according to annual
income is still the norm. This apparent divergence between policy application and academic
emphasis is attributable to concerns both philosophical and practical in nature. The various
arguments against using the lifetime framework, and our responses to these criticisms, are
discussed later in this paper.
We argue here that lifetime models of tax incidence can play a valuable role in the
analyses of real-world tax reforms. The concept of the lifetime incidence of a tax simply
suggests an additional examination, namely, of lifetime tax burdens relative to lifetime incomes.
Our model generates distributional tables very similar to those which are already widely used
in government circles. Because lifetime income may not reflect current ability to pay taxes,
however, the lifetime framework can a supplement rather than replace the traditional annual
approach. In other words, policymakers might worry that current taxes reflect current ability
to pay, aLi4 that lifetime taxes reflect lifetime ability to pay.The differences between annual and lifetime incidence have considerable bearingon
certainpolicyissues. A good example is the ongoing debate about the relative meritsof
consumption-based taxesversus income-based taxes. Proponentsstress thata consumptiontax
wouldincreaseeconomic efficiency byremovingthedoubletaxationofinterest income.
Dynamic life-cyclemodels cancalculate the welfare gains from removingtheseintertemporaj
distortions, so the lifetime perspective is likely to favorconsumptiontaxes from an efficiency
standpoint. Opponents stress that consumption taxes are regressive, placing relatively greater
effective tax rates on households with low income. Yet this latterargument is based on an
annual perspective. A consumption tax must be regressive withrespect to annual income, since
consumption makes up a high fraction of earnings for low-income groups. From a lifetime
perspective, however, Poterba (1989) and others point out that if the present value of lifetime
consumption equals the present value of lifetime income, then the lifetime incidence ofa
uniform-rate consumption tax is necessarily proportional. Thusconsumption-based taxes are
likely to look much more desirable when tising a lifetime model than when usingan annual
model, from both efficiency and equity standpoints.
A wage tax has steady-state effects much like aconsumption tax, both in terms of
efficiency and in terms of lifetime incidence. It differs in transition,however, since retired
generations would prefer the switch to a wage tax rather than the switch toa consumption tax.
In this paper we use a consumption tax and awage tax as examples for measuring
lifetime distributional effects, and we generate results that shednew light on the tradeoff between
intertemporal efficiency and distributional equity. We use a sophisticatedgeneral equilibrium
model developed in Fullerton and Rogers (1993) to calculate theeconomic incidence, that is, the
distribution of real burdens from a consumption tax. Mostimportantly, we consider the
regressivity of a consumption tax when individuals are classified not by their annual income but
instead by lifetime income. Distinguishingamong different lifetime-income categories, we are3
ableto characterize the pattern of lifetime tax burdens relative to lifetime incomes, using utility-
based"equivalent-variation"measures.
Withinthe model we havedeveloped, the lifetime incidenceof a uniform consumption
tax is a bit more interesting than the purely proportional outcome suggestedby Poterba. Inour
model, for three reasons, a consumption tax is typically not proportional on a lifetime basis.
First, some groups receive more bequests which enable them to spend more than they earn.
Second, individuals are classified by the present value of potential earnings, as a measure of
well-being, so some groups may choose to work more and consume more taxed commodities
instead of untaxed leisure. Third, the distributional effects of a consumption tax depend on
which current tax it replaces.
To concentrate on these issues regarding inherent regressivity, we consider a flat tax on
all consumption at the same rate. This uniform consumption tax can be interpreted as a
proportional tax on individual consumption, as a. national sales tax on all goods, or as a value-
added tax (VAT) at a single rate) We thus ignore many differences in the administration of
the tax, especially whether it is collected from individuals or from firms. And we ignore any
progressivity that might be added into the system, either through graduated rates on an individual
consumption tax base or through exemptions of necessities from a value added tax base.
The next section describes current approaches that categorize households either by annual
'An individual consumption tax could operate like the current individual tax, with the
inclusion of all sources of income and the deduction of all forms of savings. Since all income
must either be consumed or saved, income minus savings must equal consumption. This tax
base can be applied to a progressive rate structure. In contrast, a VAT would apply to value-
added at each stage of production, measured by sales revenue minus the cost of all intermediate
inputs.If full deductions are allowed for the cost of capital goods, then the VAT is a
consumption-based tax. On each final product, the total revenue collected from a VAT is equal
to the sum of amounts paid at each stage. Since the value of the final product is just the sum
of value-added at each stage, this consumption-based tax is equivalent to a retail sales tax. A
specific VAT proposal may exempt certain goods and place different rates of tax on different
industries. We do not consider these many variants.4
income or by age, and how we combine those two approaches. We outline our efforts in five
steps, and we summarize results. Section UI then addresses a fundamental obstacle to the use
oflifetime models in distributionalanalysis, namely,thelack of data on lifetimeincomes. We
explainhow we tackle thisproblemby econometricestimationof lifetime incomes using panel
data. Section IV describes the general equilibrium nature of our model, which allows us to
account for behavioral responses and price changes in calculating the distributional effects of tax
policies. Greater detail on our model can be found in Fullerton and Rogers (1993). In Section
V we simulate the replacement of each major U.S.taxwith a uniform consumption tax, and with
a wage tax, and we determine the lifetime regressivity or progressivity of the various existing
taxes relative to these two alternatives. Distributional tables show lifetime equivalent variations
(tax burdens) relative to lifetime incomes (lifetime abilities to pay) under two parameterizations.
Section VI discusses some of the arguments against incorporation of lifetime analysis into the
policy arena. Section VII concludes.
II. HOWWE COMBINEEXISTING APPROACHES
Existingstudies of tax incidence fall into two general categories. The most common
approach in policy analysis begins by dividing all households into groups based on some measure
of their current annual economic income.2 Such studies then collect data on thewages and
salaries of households in each group, capital income such as interest and dividends, and
expenditures on each commodity. Shifting of tax burdens onto each group can then be measured
from estimated changes in wages, interest rates, and commodityprices.
A problem with this approach, however, is that the lowest-annual-incomegroup is a
mixed bag. It includes some young workers just starting a career whoare expected to earn more
2This approach is exemplified by Pechman and Okner (1974) and Ballardet al (1985).5
later, some retirees who had earned more earlier, some peopte with volatile income who just had
a bad year, and, finally, the perennially poor. Yet the concern of policy must differ for these
four types of individuals: some are really poor, some are comfortable, and some are actually
very rich. Even if careful study shows that a particular tax change redistributes from a high-
income group to a low-income group, little is known about what happens to the welfare of
individuals who move among the annual income classes during their lives. Indeed, most of us
move up the income scale during working years and then back to Low income upon retirement.
The second approach proceeds by dividing all households into groups on the basis of their
age. Such studies are typically based on the "life-cycle" model, that is, a specification of
individuals' entire lifetime plans for saving and consuming during working years followed by
dissaving and consuming during retirement years.3 Such a model is used to calculate
equilibriumpricesover time and to report present value changes in lifetime tax incidence. These
studies focusonhow taxes affect savings incentives, capital formation, and future productivity.
They canalso simulate a tax change,estimateeffects on wage rates and interestrates,and
measure redistributions between young and old.
Asimpler,partial-equilibrium version of this second approach is used in the "generational
accounting" frameworkdiscussed by LaurenceKotlikoff in this volume. This framework focuses
on what the government's intertemporal budget constraint implies about the intergenerational
incidence of government policies.Effective tax rates can be computed for many different
cohorts of households. For simplicity these measures assume constant prices and unchanged
behavior, but the consequence is that generational accounts for alternative policies do not reflect
predicted outcomes or changes in economic welfare. Generational accounting seems most
valuable in addressing questions about current policies, such as the extent to which each
3Examptes are Summers (1981) and Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Skinner (1983).6
generation pays for its own programs over its own lifetime —anassessment that annual deficit
accounting clearly fails to provide.
A general problem with this second approach is that it considers only one kind of
individual in each age group. Different generations are alive at one time, and the model can
calculate effects on these different age groups, but individuals are not distinguished by level of
well-being. This kind of model misses the fundamental distinction between rich and poor, a
distinction that plays prominently in any policy debate about the distributional effects of taxes.
To illustrate the distinction between the two approaches, suppose that the economy
included only the two types of individuals depicted in Figure 1. One type has relativelypoor
lifetime prospects, advancing with age through points A, B, C, and D. The other type has
relatively rich prospects, and advances with age through points E, F, 0, and H. The typical
annual incidence study would take individuals at point 0 as the highest-incomegroup, lump
together individuals at points F and C for the second group, lump together those at points B, B,
and H for a third group, and add those at points A and D for the poorestgroup. They might
then find how taxes redistribute among these groups, but the results wouldconvey nothing about
what happens to either of the two individuals of concern.
In contrast, the typical life-cycle or generational accounting study wouldlump together
individuals at points A and E as one youngestgroup, those at B and P as another group, C and
G as the next group, and D with H as the oldestgroup. The model could then calculate
redistributions between the old, the young, and later generations, but not between rich andpoor.
Neither of these approaches captures the fundamental distinction between thetwo types of
individuals in this economy.4
4Just a few studies have considered the incidence of taxesacross different lifetime income
categories. Using Canadian data, Davies et al. (1984) construct lifetime histories of earnings,
transfers, inheritances, savings, consumption and bequests. They then measure lifetime income,
classify households, and add up the burdens under alternative incidence assumptions. Thus,they7
Ournew model combines these two approaches. We distinguish between rich andpoor,
but we classifyindividualson the basis of lifetime income. We use the model here to evaluate
the lifetime incidenceof a consumption tax anda wagetax. In order to avoid the debate about
deficit reduction, however, we simulate the effects of using a consumption tax orwage tax to
replaceeach existingU.S. tax, one at a time. This "differential incidence" depends on features
ofthe taxbeing replaced,so wemust specifydetails of personalincome taxes, corporatetaxes,
and all other U.S. taxinstruments.
This effort canbedescribed in five major steps. First, we startwithdata from the Panel
Study ofIncomeDynamics, including thousands ofobservationsofindividuals over an 18-year
period.With allindividualstogether, we estimate the wage rate as a function of age andother
demographic variables. We then construct a lifetime wage profile for each individual, using
actualwage ratesfor available years and predicted wage ratesinother years. We use this wage
profile tocalculate the individual's present valueofpotentiallifetime earnings. We rank
individuals by lifetime income and classifytheminto twelvelifetime income groups.
Second, for each lifetimeincome group, we re-estimate the wage profile as a function
ofage. We also estimate age-profiles forthepersonal income tax andforgovernment transfers
such as social security. The estimated wage profile rises and then falls over time for all groups,
but the steepness and the timing of the peaks differ. Groups that earn relatively more of theft
income earlier in life must save more for retirement. These groups are then likely to benefit
more from a consumption tax used to replace anytaxon capital income.Also,we add to each
usethe same basic approach as Pechman and Okner but extend it to a lifetime context. Poterba
(1989) focuses on sales and excise tax burdens in the United States. Appealing to the permanent
income hypothesis of Friedman (1957), he uses current consumption as a proxy for lifetime
income inorderto classify households. Re agrees with Davies et al. that sales and excise taxes
are less regressive in the lifetime context. Lyon and Schwab (1990) use data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics in a model of life-cycle behavior to find that cigarette taxes are just
as regressive, and alcohol taxes are slightly less regressive, when measured with respect to
lifetime income rather thanannual income.S
group an estimate of inheritances.These are highly concentrated at the top of the income
distribution, and they also affect the incidence of replacing taxes on capital income.
Third, we use data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey to estimate how people
allocate their consumption among specific commodities. These choices depend on age and on
income. If a uniform consumption tax replaces one that affects relative product prices, it may
then burden some groups more than others.
Fourth, we build a general equilibrium simulation model that encompasses all major U.S.
taxes,many industries, both corporate and noncorporate sectors within each industry, and
consumers identified by both age and lifetime income. It is not a model of annual decision-
making, but a life-cycle model in which each individual faces a particular inheritance, a set of
tax rules, a wage profile, and a transfer profile. Each then plans an entire lifetime of labor
supply, savings, demand for each consumption commodity, and bequest. We also specify
producer behavior, which determines each industry's use of labor, capital, and intermediate
inputs. We can then simulate the effects of a tax change on each economic decision through
time. We calculate new labor supplies, savings, capital stocks, outputs, and prices. With effects
on all ages in all years, we can also calculate the change in economic welfare for groups ranging
from those with low lifetime income to those with high lifetime income.
Fifth, we evaluate the effects of using a consumption tax or a wage tax to replace each
U.S.tax.In our model these two replacement taxes axe not equivalent. During the transition,
retiredindividualsprefer the wage tax. Even in the steady state, because of inheritances, the
presentvalueof consumption for anyindividualexceeds the present value ofwageincome.5
Thus the consumption tax base is larger than thewage tax base, allowing a lower tax rate and
'Individuals are born with an endowment of capital and must die with the same amount of
capital, augmented by the rate of economic growth. Because the specified growth rate is lower
than the specified interest rate1 consumption possibilities are augmented by these bequests.9
a greater efficiency gain. Also, because these inheritances are concentrated in the higher
lifetime income categories, the consumption tax is more burdensome than the wage tax on the
lifetimerich.
Usingeither consumptionorwagetaxes,wefind that replacement ofthe personalincome
taxis regressive, while the replacement of current sales andexcisetaxeswouldbe progressive.
The reason isthat current sales andexcisetaxesplacehigher rateson goods like alcohol and
tobacco that constitute a higher fraction of low-income groups' spending. Replacement of the
payroll tax is also progressive, because the current tax is regressive.
Replacement of the property tax raises the net rate of return to capital in our model, so
it helps high-income groups on the sources side. It also reduces the cost of housing, however,
so it benefits tow-income households on the uses side. Thus the overall pattern of gains is U-
shaped across our lifetime income groups.
Our results for replacement of the corporation income tax are a bit surprising. In the
standard analysis, replacement of the corporation income tax would raise the net rate of return
to all owners of capital. Since these capital owners are in high-annual-income brackets, the
change would be regressive. In our base year of 1984, however, the corporation income tax
collects very little revenue.6 Any tax that might have been collected on the return to equity is
largely offset by interest deductions, investment tax credits, and accelerated depreciation
allowances. The removal of the corporate tax system of credits and deductions hardly affects
the overall rate of return on the sources side. It does raise costs for industries that received
more than the average amount of investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation allowances,
however, and it therefore reduces the relative cost of other outputs such as tobacco and gasoline.
6This revenue is calculated from observed capital stocks, an assumed 4 percent net rate of
return, and effective tax rates that reflect the statutory tax rules for different assets under 1984
law. It thus reflects a long-run equilibrium, not short-run profit fluctuations.10
These goods constitute a highfractionof low-income budgets, on the uses side, so the change
has a DroEressive effect in our model.
Thefive stepsdescribed above comprise our particular approach to evaluating lifetime
taxincidence. Ingeneral,ouranalysisemphasizes the estimationoflifetime incomesusing panel
data,the use of detailed consumptiondatato determineconsumption patterns,and thegeneral-
equilibriumdetermination of tax burdens. In order to applythelifetime approach in routine
policy analysis, it is possible to simplify the procedure. Some of these possible simplifications
will be discussed below.
Ill. AMEASURE OFLIFETIME INCOME
Inorder to discusshowlifetimeincome can differ fromannualincome, webeginwith
acase wherethetwo measuresareidentical. If eachperson'sincome never changedover time,
thenannualincome wouldaccuratelyreflectpermanent income.Eachpath in Figure1would
be flat, and individualswould not change annualincomecategories.In this case, thepoorest
annualincome category wouldinclude thesame individualsasthe poorest lifetimecategory.
The first difference between the two measures therefore arises from hump-shaped income
profiles. Many studies confirm that incomes rise during early years, level off during later
working years, and fall during retirement. This pattern puts young and old lifetime-rich
individuals into low annual-income groups. The different groupings can affect incidence results.
A second difference can arise simply with income volatility. Self-employed individuals
with a mid-range permanent income might be placed into a high-annual-incomecategory, or a
low-annual-income category, depending on the year taken for study. Employed workers subject
to temporary lay-offs may experience similar fluctuations in annual incomes.
A third distinction is that, while the annual incidence of capital taxation depends on fixed
capital endowments, the lifetime incidence of capital taxation depends on inheritances and on the11
shape of the earninas profiles. If this profile is steeply peaked, the individual must save more
for retirement and bear more burdenofcapital taxation. In our results below, we find that
incidence depends not only on the height of the peak but on the timing of the peak. For
example, we find that the earnings of middle income groups tend to peak later in life, so those
groups do not accumulate as much savings relative to richer and poorer groups. The burden of
capital taxation falls on those whose earnings peak early and who therefore save more for later.
A fourth difference is that the composition of lifetime income varies less than the
composition of annual income. Differences in the capital-share of annual incomes that arise
from the average amount of life-cycle savings are not relevant in the lifetime perspective. The
only relevant differences in the composition of lifetime income must derive from bequests and
inheritances, or from variations in the timing of earnings relative to consumption. Therefore
taxes that change relative factor prices have less effect on the sources side. Similarly, all
individuals progress from one set of consumption goods when young to another set of
consumption goods when old. The composition of spending may still depend on income, in the
lifetime perspective, but it does not depend on age. Therefore taxes that change relative goods
prices have less effect on the uses side.
These considerations suggest that alldistributionaleffects of taxes are likely to be muted
in the lifetime context. The progressivity of the personal income tax places low tax rates not
just on the lifetime-poor, but also on the lifetime-rich who are young. In addition, high personal
taxes may be paid by lifetime-poor individuals who happen to be at the top of their earnings
hump. On the other hand, a progressive annual tax structure generates heavier burdens on
individuals with more humped lifetime income profiles, all else equal.
To estimate lifetime incomes, we require longitudinal data for many individuals over
many years.This analysis has only recently become possible, because the University of
Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) has been asking the same questions of theI2
same individuals now for over 18 years. From the PSID,wedraw a sample of 500 households
that includes 858 adult individuals with information on wages, taxes, transfers, and various
demographicvariables for theyears 1970-87.We include headsand wives in our sample, and
forsimplicity indefiningthe lifetime of a "household", we exclude households whosemarital
status varied over the sample period. For heads and wives separately, we estimatethewage rate
as a nonlinear function of age, so that for each individual in the sample we can: I.) predict the
wage rate for years that come after as well as before the sample period, 2.) multiply the actual
or estimated gross-of-tax wage rate by a total number of hours per year (e.g. 4000) to get the
value of the endowment, and 3.) calculate the present value of this endowment for each person.
Thus our level of well-being is defined by ootential earnings, including the value of leisure.
These levels are used to classify households into twelve groups according to lifetime ability-to-
pay, where we define a household's lifetime income to be the average of the head's and wife's
(if any) lifetime incomes. We start with ten deciles, but we separate the poorest 2 percent from
the next poorest 8 percent, and we separate the richest 2 percent from the next richest 8 percent.
Also, we are interested in the timing of income, because the shape of an individual's
lifetime income profile determines the composition of annual income. Therefore we reestimate
the nonlinear wage profile separately for each of the twelve groups. In addition, we require
information on the time path of personal income taxes paid, and transfers received, in order to
set up a consistent benchmark data set with a path of consumer spending out of total available
net-of-tax income.
Thus our lifetime income and classification differs from previous studies such as Pechman
and Okner (1974) because of hump-shaped earnings profiles, volatility in annuai income, the
timing of the peak in earnings, the exclusion of capital income, the use of a life-cycle model,
the use of heads and spouses (but not entire households) as the unit ofaccount, and the decision
to include leisure in the total value of endowment. The next logical question, therefore, is13
whetherthese issues really matter. How islifetime classification different from the standard sort
of classification?
We find that the annual income categories do not match up with the lifetime income
categories for the same individuals. For each of our 858 individuals, we calculate annual
income in 1984 for classification into annual income deciles. As it turns out, only 21.1 percent
of these individuals are in the same annual and lifetime income deciles, and only 46.1 percent
are within plus-or-minus one of the same decile. Most of the differences occur when someone
who is lifetime-rich is very young or very old and earns low annual income. If we label the
bottom 30 percent of the population the "poor" and the top 30 percent the "rich", we find that
13.8 percent of the annual poor are lifetime rich, and 2.6 percent of the annual rich are lifetime
poor. We conclude that annual and lifetime income classifications are too different to assume
that annual and lifetime tax incidence will be similar.
The final wage profiles for several of the lifetime income categories are illustrated in
Figure 2. Each is the profile for a representative individual in the category. Groups 1 and 2
represent the lowest 2 percent and next lowest 8 percent of the lifetime income distribution,
respectively. Group 4 represents individuals between the 20th and 30th percentiles, and Group
9 consists of those between the 70th and 80th percentiles. Group 12 is the top 2 percent of the
population, and Group ills the next highest 8 percent.
From Figure 2 it is apparent that individuals in the higher lifetime income categories are
characterized by wage profiles that are more peaked. The richest category (Group 12) appears
to be significantly more peaked than the second richest (Group 11), which suggests that our split
of the top decile is important. Because we use life-cycle consumption behavior in our model,
the increasing peakedness implies that higher lifetime income categories will save more for
retirement and will have higher ratios of capital to labor income. This ratio is key to the
determination of the incidence of a consumption tax relative to capital taxes.14
In Figure 2 we can also see that these wage profiles peak at different points in the life
cycle. For the first few income groups, the peak age has a slight upward trend, as group 2
peaks at age 39, group 4 peaks at age 47, and group 9 peaks at age 64. Then, at higher levels
of income, the peak wage years come earlier, at age 50 for group 11 and at 47 for group 12.
Thus the middle-income groups, with the later earnings peaks, do not need to save as much for
retirement. The lowest income groups and the highest income groups have earlier peaks, save
more during life, and bear more burden of capital taxation.
IV. THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
Our approach to the analysis of lifetime tax incidence uses a rather sophisticated general-
equilibrium model to account for the behavioral effects and excess burdens caused by taxes. We
want to capture important influences of taxes on diverse household choices about labor supply,
savings, and the consumption of different cbmmodities. We therefore assume utility
maximization to find demands for commodities and supply of factors. We also want to capture
effects of taxes on each producer's use of labor and capital, so we assume profit maximization
to find demands for factors. We solve for general equilibrium prices in order to capture the net
impact of taxes when these behaviors axe considered simultaneously.
We assume that consumer decisions are made in stages. To begin, the individual
calculates thepresentvalue of potential lifetime earnings. This endowment is supplemented by
government transfers, reduced by taxes, discounted at the after-tax interest rate, and augmented
by a fixed initial inheritance. For computational simplicity, we assume that the consumer
expects the current interest rate to prevail in all future periods.
One part of this lifetime endowment must be saved for a bequest upon death. We avoid
the many possible motivations for individual bequests, or the manyways in which taxes might
affect the size of those bequests (see Bernheim, 1991). Instead, we are concerned that life-cycle15
saving by itself can only explain about half of the observed capital stock (Kottikoff and
Summers,1981). In our model, part ofthe capital stock is attributable to the fact that
individuals receive exogenous inheritances and are then simply required to leave comparable
bequests at the end of life. Incidence results depend on the differences in these exogenous
inheritances among groups. To achieve balanced growth, each group must add some additional
savings to their inheritance before they make their bequest.
The rest of the present value of income is available for spending. Decisions are made
in stages, as depicted in Figure 3. At the first stage, the consumer chooses how much to spend
each period. This choice depends on our assumption for the individual's rate of time preference
(.005inthe central case) and the elasticity of substitution among time periods (0.5 in the central
case). We later test the sensitivity of results to these parameters. The consumer's choice about
how much to spend each period is also affected by changes in the net rate of return (which starts
at .04 in the central case).
At the second stage, the consumer allocates one period's "spending" between leisure and
other consumption goods. This choice depends on our assumption regarding another elasticity
of substitution (0.5 in the central case). We allow individuals to "buy" more leisure at a price
equal to the foregone net-of-tax wage, instead of buying other goods. This choice is affected
by taxes, and it also depends on age. Individuals in this model never fully retire, but the weight
on leisure increases with age after they reach 60,ina way that reflects actual choices.
In the third stage, individuals decide how to allocate current consumption spending among
17 particular goods (such as food, alcohol, tobacco, utilities, housing, etc.). This decision
function takes a "Stone-Cieary" form, which means that a consumer at a given age has to buy
a set of 17 "minimum required purchase" amounts and then allocates remaining spending
according to a set of 17 "marginal expenditure shares." These 34 parameters are estimated for
each of 12 age categories using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, as described16
thoroughly in Fullerton and Rogers (1993). This Stone-Geary framework hasseveralimportant
implications. By making a portion of spending non-discretionary, it reduces the sensitivity of
total consumptionandsavingto the net rateof return. In addition, because discretionary income
maybe spent in proportions different from minimum requirements, actual purchase proportions
dependon total income.Required spending is relatively high for housing andgasoline,while
discretionaryspending is relatively high for clothing, services, and recreation. Thus the rich
and the poor buy different bundles, and bear different burdens on the uses side.7
In the fourth stage of our consumer's allocation process, in Figure 3, the expenditure on
each consumer good is divided by fixed coefficients among components drawn from a list of
producer industries.No real 'decision" is made here, but this step allows us to match up
consumption data using one definition of commodities with production data using a different
definition. For example, expenditure on the consumer good "appliances" is composed of
portions from metals and machinery, from transonadon, and from the trade industry.
Then, in the fifth and final stage of the decision tree, the consumer takes the spending
on each industry output and allocates it between the corporate sector and the noncorporate
sector. We assume that the corporate output is not identical to the noncorporate output in the
same industry. Hand-carved furniture, for example, is not the same as manufactured furniture.
The consumer chooses the amount of each, using a weighing parameter based on initial observed
'This framework also allows us to use the same utility function foreveryonein the model,
In previous efforts, rich and poor individuals spend in different proportions because they have
different preferences. But then the rich and the poor differ in fundamental characteristics and
not just by the amount of income they receive. We feel that this assumption is very arbitrary:
even if the poor were to receive additional income, they would still spend it as if they were
poor, according to their unchanged proportions. It seems more natural, to us, that a poor person
with more money would begin to behave like a richperson. That is, the primary distinction
between rich and poor is the amount of income they receive. Therefore, in our model,everyone
has the same preference parameters. Thepoor spend more on goods with high minimum
required expenditures, because they are poor, and the rich spend more on goods with relatively
high marginal expenditure shares.17
corporateandnoncorporateshares of production within each industry,and usinganother
elasticityof substitution (5.0 in the central case). This specificationallowsus to capture the
observed co-existence of both sectors within an industry, despite different tax treatments. If the
outputswereidentical, then a higher tax rate would drive one sector out of production. The
degreeof similarity is reflectedinthe elasticity ofsubstitution.The other purposeofthis
specificationisto capture ways in which changesincorporatetaxesaffectrelative productprices
and quantities demandedofthe outputsofeach sector.
Weemployasimilar decisiontree, depictedin Figure 4,to modelproducerbehaviorin
each sector of each industry. Each output is produced by many competitive firms in multi-stage
production functions with constant returns to scale. Also, for computational simplicity, we
assume no externalities, no adjustment costs, and no uncertainty.
In the first stage of production, output is composed of a fixed coefficient combination of
value-added and intermediate inputs. Each of the 19 industries uses the outputs of all other
industries, in fixed proportions. Thus we capture the effect of one product price upon another.
In the second stage, value-added is a function of labor and "composite". capital. The weighing
parameters are based on observed labor and capital in each industry, and the elasticity of
substitution varies by industry (between .68 and .96, in the central case). Thus a tax on labor
can induce the firm to use more capital instead, and vice versa.It also raises the cost of
production, and thus output price, in any industry that uses a high proportion of the taxed factor.
In the third and final stage of production, composite capital is a function of five asset
types --equipment,structures, land, inventories, and intangibles. These types are defined by
importanttaxdifferences such as the investment credit for equipment and the expensing of new
intangible assetscreatedthrough advertising or research and development.Theweightingshares
are again based on observed use of assets in each industry, and the response to tax differentials
is again specified by an elasticity of substitution (1.5 in the central case).18
Government in this modelconducts severalfunctions. It pays transfers to individuals
according to the estimated lifetime transfer profiles discussed in the previous section.It
producesan output for salethrough an industry called "government enterprises," and it also
producesafree public goodthrough a composite combination ofits useoflabor,capital, and
purchasesofe4chprivate industry output. Theweightsin thiscombination are based on
observed governmentpurchases,and the elasticity of substitutionisone. The level of this public
good is held fixedin all simulations, as anytaxchange is accompanied by anadjustmentthat
ensuresequal-revenue yield. A final government function, of course, is to collect taxes.
Each tax instrument enters the model as a wedge between the producer's price and the
consumer's price. Thepayrolltax, for example, applies an ad valorem rate to each producer's
use of labor, so the gross-of-tax wage paid by the producer is higher than the net-of-tax wage
received by the worker. Similarly, sales and excise taxes appear as ad valorem rates on each
consumer good, so the gross-of-tax price paid by the consumer exceeds the net-of-tax price
received by the seller.
The personal income tax is a little more complicated, in order to capture its progressive
effect on tax burdens. The actual U.S. personal tax system imposes higher effective tax rates
on higher incomes through a graduated rate structure with a changing marginal tax rate. For
some purposes, one must calculate the effects of individual choices at each different possible
marginal tax rate in order to determine utility-maximizing behavior. Our primary goal,
however, is to measure the distributional effects of the tax. For this purpose, it is sufficient to
use a set of linear tax functions that approximate the U.S. system with a negative intercept for
each group and a single marginal tax rate (.3 in the central case). Although all individuals face
the same marginal tax rate, average tax rates still increase with income due to the negative
intercepts. We do not model the myriad exemptions and deductions. These simpler, linear tax
functions can replicate the observed data on personal taxes actually paid by each group.19
The state andlocal property tax and theU.S.federal corporate income tax raise the
producer's gross-of-tax cost of capital, for each asset type, relative to the investor's net-of-tax
rate of return. A Hail-Jorgenson (1967) formulashows howthe cost of capital for each asset
depends on the statutory corporate tax rate, depreciation allowances at historical cost, the rate
at which inflation erodes those allowances, the rate of investment tax credit, and the required
net rate of return for the firm. This required rate of return depends, in turn, on the going
market rate and the personal taxation of interest, dividends, and capital gains. A similar cost
of capital formula applies to the noncorporate sector. This treatment allows the producer's
choice among assets to depend on relative tax rules, and the price of output in each industry to
depend on the relative use of assets with different effective tax rates.
Other assumptions help to close the model in a way that accounts for all flows and that
helps facilitate computation. We ignore international mobility of labor or capital, but allow for
trade of industry outputs. Also, the value of imports must match the value of exports; the
government's expenditures and transfer payments must match tax revenue; and, the value of
personal savings must match the value of investment expenditures. Producer investment is not
the result of firms' intertemporal optimization, but instead follows personal savings from
consumers' optimization. The amount of personal savings is growing over time, because
consumers' labor earnings are growing through population and technical change. On the steady
state growth path, the capital stock grows at exactly the same rate as the effective laborstock.
Data for this model derive from many sources, adjusted to represent 1984 as the base
year. In addition to the survey data used to estimate wage profilesand preference parameters,
we use the National Income and Product Accounts for an input-outputmatrix, labor
compensation by industry, government purchases, and international trade. These publisheddata
are combined with other unpublished data on capital allocations and inheritances.
For some parameters, such as the elasticities of substitution, we assume particular values.20
Forotherparameters, such as the Stone-Geary preferences, we have econometric estimates.
Finally,for remaining parameters, we "calibrate" from data on actual allocations. We use the
demandfunctions,and all initial prices and observed quantities,tosolve backwards for the value
ofthe parameter that would make that quantitythedesired one. Thisprocedureestablishes a
"benchmark"equilibrium, with existing tax rules and prices, such that all consumers are buying
the desired quantities and supplyingthedesired amounts of each factor, white producers are
using theirdesiredamountsoffactorsto produce thedesiredoutput.
Thus, using alltheseparameters together, we can solve for an equilibrium with
unchanged tax rules that replicates the benchmark consistent data. This provides an important
check on the solution procedure. From this benchmark, we can alter any particulartaxrule and
see how much more or less the consumers want to buy of each good. The solution algorithm
then raises the price of any good in excess demand, and lowers the price of any good in excess
supply, until it finds a set of prices where the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded
for every good and factor. It "simulates" the effect of the tax change, to calculate all new
prices,quantities, andlevelsofconsumer utility. Our measure of the change in tax burden is
the"equivalentvariation," the dollarvalue of thechange inutility measured in terms of
benchmarkprices. We compare the lifetime equivalent variations to each category's lifetime
income in order to determine relative lifetime tax burdens and the lifetime incidence of the
varioustaxes, relative to the consumption- or wage-tax replacement.
V.RESULTS
As discussed inthe introduction,theincidenceof anyadditionaltax within the general
equilibrium model is defined relative to the tax which it replaces. We focus on the lifetime
incidence ofa general consumptiontax(Tables 1 and 2), and a wage tax (Tables 3 and 4).
Althoughboth types of replacement taxes are intertemporally efficient, the consumption tax base21
is larger than the wage tax base due to the presence of bequests. The timing of the two taxes
also differs, because life-cycle behavior generates consumption paths that are smoother than the
peaked wage paths. The two replacements therefore can produce very different transitional
effects, but our results emphasize the long-run, steady-state incidence of taxes.
The distributional effects between rich and poor are measured by the gains to each
lifetime income group in the steady state. The results for the consumption-tax replacement using
our central parameterization are shown in Table 1. Overall gains in the steady state are shown
at the bottom of each column in the table. This steady-state welfare gain is not a pure efficiency
measure, because it includes redistribution to later generations from current generations who
may lose when the tax change is imposed. Indeed, we often find gains to future steady-state
generations and losses to older transitional generations. For an overall measure of efficiency,"
at the bottom of the table, we simply take the present value of all equivalent variations for all
generations, discounted at the net rate of return.8
Each table includes a column for each U.S. tax instrument being removed. We first
discuss the consumption-tax replacement. In the first column of Table 1, the effects of replacing
the personal income tax range froma 5percent loss of income for the poorest group to a 9
percent gain for the richest group. The pattern is clearly regressive. The bottom of the column
indicates that this replacement would yield an overall steady-state gain equal to 2.6 percent of
income. This amount is also equal to 21 percent of the personal income tax revenue being
replaced. The present-value gain is .7 percent of income (5 percent of revenue). The difference
is caused by losses to transitional generations. Those who are near retirement at the time of the
8llis procedure implicitly puts lower weight on later generations, but the discounting is
necessary in order to obtain a finite sum for a sequence that is growing over time because of
technical progress and population growth. In order to avoid having a measure of efficiency that
would increase with the number of individuals, we discount by population growth to calculate
this present value EV for the size of the population alive at the time of the change.22
change would have paid low personal income taxesover theremainder oftheir lifetimes, but the
consumptiontax applies to all their remaining consumption.
The .7 percent efficiency gain might be considered substantial, especially since the
personal income tax and the consumption tax kQth distort labor supply decisions.But
progressivity makesthe personalincome tax more distorting. The personal marginal tax rate
exceeds the total tax as a fraction of income, as is necessary for that average tax rate to rise with
income. Distortions depend on the .30 marginal tax rate, while revenue depends on the avenge
rate. Thus the personal income tax is relatively distorting per dollar of revenue. In contrast,
the uniform consumption tax needs a rate of only .12 to collect the same revenue.
In the second column, a consumption tax is used to replace all existing U.S.salesand
excise taxes. Contrary to initial intuition, this introduction of a consumption tax is clearly
progressive. The explanation is that current sales and excise taxes are more regressive because
they apply at nonuniform rates. Actual incidenèe depends on the pattern of tax rates and the
pattern of goods consumed by the different lifetime income categories. Indeed, the point of our
Stone-Geary specification is to allow for rich and poor households to purchase goods in different
proportions. As it turns out, poorer households consume proportionately larger amounts of the
high-taxed goods such as gasoline, alcohol, and tobacco. Poterba (1989) may be right that a
uniform consumption tax would be proportional to lifetime income with no bequests, but the
sales and excise taxes are not uniform. The rate structure introduces regressivity.9
The difference between the 1 percent steady-state welfare gain and the overall 0.18
percent efficiency gain indicates how much of the steady-state gain is attributable to effects in
the transition.
9Both the existing sales and excise taxes and the replacement consumption tax exempt
untaxed leisure, but they both apply to spending out of inheritances. Fullerton and Rogers
(1993) show how these considerations affect the regressivity of all of these consumption taxes.23
The third column of Table 1 considers the replacement of U.S. payroll taxes with a
uniform consumption taxAgain the consumption tax replacement is quite progressive on a
lifetime basis. And again this result conflicts with initial intuitions. In a simple life-cycle model
withnobequests, each individual's present value of lifetime labor income exactly equals the
presentvalueof consumption. Therefore a uniform consumption tax is equivalent to a flat wage
tax. Here the equivalence is broken by bequests which rise as a fraction of total endowment for
higher lifetime-income groups. These high income individuals are required to leave the same
size bequest as they receive, but they get to consume out of the extra capital income during their
lifetimes. Therefore the consumption tax base exceeds the labor tax base for them. The simple
consumption tax is more progressive than a labor income tax.
The switch from the payroll tax to consumption tax hurts the elderly, raises revenue from
them, and allows gains to subsequent generations. These intergenerational gains and losses are
shown graphically in Figure 5, for three of thd tax change simulations. Lifetime effects of
replacing the payroll tax on labor are represented by the bottom, solid line. Small net losses are
incurred by those "born" 20 to 60 years ago (with chronological age 40 to 80). Net lifetime
effects are positive and growing for those born later. The small bump for those born five years
after the change is only an artifact of our five-year snapshots. Those born ten years after the
change, and later, receive the steady-state gain equal to .50 percent of lifetime income. As
shown in Table 1, the present value of these net effects is a mere .05 percent of the present
value of all lifetime incomes. Gains to steady state generations are almost completely offset by
losses to transitional generations, so the consumption tax is no more efficient than the labor
income tax. Both distort primarily only labor supply decisions. The difference is purely
distributional. The payroll tax is more regressive than the consumption tax.
In the fourth column of Table 1, if the consumption tax replaces current property taxes,
the distribution of gains is U-shaped. This replacement raises the net rate of return and affects24
owners of capital on the sources side. Because wage profiles peak laterfor middle income
groups in Figure 2 above, they save less. Thusthe ratio of capita! income to labor income is
approximately U-shapedacrossthe lifetime income groups. The property tax repeal also reduces
the cost of housing and thus helps low-income groups on the uses side.
The efficiency gain is only .17 percent of income, for two reasons. First, the property
tax applies primarily to use of capital in the housing sector and thus helps offset some of the
misallocation due to high corporate taxes on other uses of capital. Thus its repeal worsens
intersectoral distortions. Second, the property tax is not a big tax. The last line shows that the
efficiency gain is 5 percent of revenue, higher than for some other tax instruments.
Finally, in the fifth column, the consumption tax is used to replace the corporate income
tax. Gains are flat or just slightly U-shaped. All groups gain front this replacement, because
the corporate tax is distortionary. The efficiency gain is a very high 84 percent of revenue,
since the 1984 corporate tax in this model misallócates resources without raising much revenue.
An apparent implication is to repeal the corporate tax. It could be entirely replaced by
a smallconsumptiontax, with gains to every income group. While this simulation does indicate
such a Pareto improvement, it does not indicate the best possible reform. The consumption tax
replacement might be costly to introduce, it might be difficult to administer, and it might not be
applied to all goods at a uniform rate as in this simulation. A different approach might "fix"
the corporate tax in order to collect more revenue with less distortion. Such an attempt was
undertaken in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
The last column of Table 1 shows the distributional effects of replacing the entire U.S.
taxsystem with a uniform consumption tax. The poorest lifetime income group would lose 2
percent of lifetime income, and the richest group would gain 12 percent of income. Thus,
current U.S.taxesare progressive relative to the consumption tax. The first five columns
indicate that most of this overall progressivity is attributable to the personal income tax.25
Overall, under the standard parameters, replacement of the entire U.S.taxsystem with
a national VAT would generate an efficiencygainequal to 1.25 percent of lifetime incomes or
3.75 percent of tax revenues.
We now vary one of the key assumptions of the model, the interteniporai substitution
elasticity. This parameter sets the degree to which consumers will switch between present
consumption and future consumption, and it therefore helps determine the responsiveness of
savings to relative prices like the net rate of return to capital. Responsive savers can 'avoid"
a tax on capital by saving less, which ultimately decreases the marginal product of labor,
decreases the wage, and shifts" the burden onto labor.
In the central-case simulations, we used .5 for this elasticity. This value might be
considered on the high end of the estimates produced by econometric studies,'° but it helps
generate a capital stock in our model that is close to that actually observed in the benchmark
data. If we simply reduced this elasticity from .5 to .25, the initial steady-state capital stock
would fall to unreasonably low levels (about 32.5 percent of the measured capital stock).
Therefore we lower this elasticity arid simultaneously lower the rate of time preference. In
combination, these respecifications leave us with an initial capital stock close to that of the
central case simulations.
Our "alternative" specification reduces the intertemporal substitution elasticity from .50
to .25, and it reduces the rate of time preference from .005 to -.005. As a theoretical matter,
this rate of time preference may be either positive or negative. As an empirical matter, many
readers may prefer a value that is even larger than the .005 we use in the standard case. The
only way to achieve a higher rate of time preference with the same capital stock, however, is
to raise the .5 value for the intertemporal substitution elasticity.
'°See Hall (1988) and other studies cited in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, pp. 50-51).
Engens (1992) estimates fall between .30 and .38 for this parameter.26
Results are shownin Table2. Comparing the present values in this table with those in
Table I, we see that these efficiency gains were larger underthe standard parameters. In our
alternative, replacement of the entire tax system with a VAT provides an efficiency gainof only
.86 percent of lifetime incomes or 2.54 percent of tax revenues.This difference arises because
the standard case uses a higher intertemporal elasticity. Thus,in the standard case, the savings
distortions under current taxes are larger, and the efficiency gainsfrom removing those
distortions are higher. The contrast between efficiency effects in TablesI and 2 is especially
clear for replacing taxes on personal income or on property,since these taxes generate the
biggest intertemporal distortions.
Tables 3 and 4 show results for the wage tax replacement, in order to emphasizethe
possible differences between consumption taxation and wagetaxation.In general, the
jgenerational patterns of tax burdens under the wage-tax replacement are verysimilar to
those under the consumption-tax replacement, ith one exception. The uniform consumption
tax looked progressive relative to current sales and excise taxes that place higher rates on goods
purchased by low-income groups, but the wage tax in Tables 3 and 4 appears to provideU-
shaped welfare gains. Low-income groups still gain from removal of regressive salesand excise
taxes, but high-income groups also gain because the wage tax does not apply to spendingout of
their larger inheritances. Also, note in Tables 3 and 4 that the replacement of current payroll
taxes with a uniform wage tax is not a neutral tax change, due to the regressivity ofthe social-
security tax system and slightly different labor tax rates across industries.
The overall level of gain to the steady-state generation is lower under the wage-tax
replacement, for two reasons. First, the smaller tax base of the wage tax necessitates a higher
replacement tax rate. These tax rates are shown in Table 5. Second, the wage-tax replacement
is relatively more burdensome to younger generations, because the consumption-tax places a
lump-sum levy on the elderly during the transition. As indicated in the bottom two rowsof27
Tables 3 and 4, overall efficiency gains are lower under the wage-tn replacement.
VI. USING THE LIFETIME HORIZON [N POLICY ANALYSIS
Our lifetime analysis has certain qualities that are desirable from an academic standpoint:
the accounting for general-equilibrium price effects, the use of utility-based measures which
include excess burden as well as taxes paid, the measurement of lifetime income to classify rich
versus poor, and finally, the measurement of lifetime burdens. These four qualities need not
always go together. One could use a general equilibrium model and utility-based welfare
measures without lifetime income or tax burdens. Also, one could look at annual tax burdens
on groups classified by lifetime income. Our model incorporates all four. Although these
qualities are attractive from an academic standpoint1 they might be viewed as obstacles from a
policy standpoint.In particular, the lifetime perspective has often been criticized as
impractical)'
The most fundamental criticism of the lifetime perspective is that it inappropriately
presumes life-cycle behavior. Based on the life-cycle model of consumption, academic literature
has often argued that lifetime income is a better indicator of a current ability to pay taxes.
Moreover, the pure life-cycle model assumes perfect capital markets. It suggests that current
consumption is proportional to lifetime income but independent of current income. Critics of
lifetime measures point to a large literature with evidence that capital markets are far from
perfect; liquidity constraints cause current consumption to track current income much more
closely than the life-cycle model would predict. In the real world, then, high lifetime income
does not necessarily allow high current consumption, and thus does not provide high current
ability to pay taxes. We have argued in Fullerton and Rogers (1993), however, that lifetime
"Many of these criticisms are discussed in the methodology pamplet produced by the Joint
Committee on Taxation (1993), pp. 32-33 and 83-86.28
income should nss be taken as a measure of current ability to pay taxes. It is simply a measure
oflifetime ability topay taxes. This interpretation applies even when the life-cycle model does
not.It suggeststhatthe lifetime perspective is a supplement toannual analyses -- a way of
assessing the long-mndistributional effectsof taxes.Policyrnakersmight worrythat current
taxesreflect current ability to payan that lifetimetaxes reflect lifetimeability topay.
This criticism ofthe life-cycle modeldoes pertainto ourparticulargeneral-equilibrium
model,however, because consumers maximize lifetime utility subject only to a lifetime budget
constraint. Thus the consumption paths generated in our model are almost certainly smoother
than real-world data would suggest. We use the life-cycle model because no other model
provides a simple theoretical foundation while better tracking real-world observations. We
modify the standard life-cycle model by adding bequests and heterogenous households, and we
use the behavioral framework in order to simulate tax changes. However, analyses of lifetime
tax incidence do not require the assumption of life-cycle behavior. One could use actual data
on assets and consumption, perhaps merged with panel data on wage income, and then make
incidence assumptions (as in Pechman and Okner, 1974, or Davies, St.-Flilaire, and Whalley,
1984). But such a model could not simulate behavioral changes in response to a tax change.
Another criticism of the lifetime perspective, as discussed by Barthold (1993), is that tax
policies never last a lifetime. Indeed, the details of the tax code are modified very frequently.
To analyze any particular reform, however, one cannot predict subsequent changes (or else those
known future changes could be analyzed as part of the reform). The model is not used to
predict the future, but to provide analytical insights and numerical magnitudes related to a
particular policy. To address conceptional questions about that policy, we hold "all else equal."
Besides, the reverse criticism could be levied against the annual perspective: major reforms last
more than one year, so why look only at one-year effects?
Another frequent complaint about the lifetime perspective is that actual data on lifetime29
incomesare simply not available. Meanwhile, the procedure we describe above to infer lifetime
incomes is thought to be too cumbersome. While measuring lifetime income is obviously much
more complicated than measuring annual income, the use of proxies for long-run income might
be considered a practical compromise. For example, as mentioned earlier, the CBO has used
one year's total expenditure as a supplementalmeasureof the ability to pay taxes. With some
kind of life-cycle smoothing behavior, total expenditures in one year would reflect long-run
income. For this reason, however, the use of the total-expenditure proxy is subject to the same
criticisms as the life-cycle model. If capital markets are imperfect, then consumption levels may
track annual income more closely than lifetime income. The total-expenditure proxy may then
better reflect annual income than lifetime income. An alternative, but still relatively simple,
proxy for lifetime income could be the level of education attained, or perhaps an estimated
function of education, race, gender, and other age-invariant variables. This latter approach is
investigated in Rogers (1994).
Finally, as suggested by the JCT (1993), computations generated by lifetime or infinite-
horizon models can be very sensitive to the choice of parameters. In particular, numerical
results are strongly dependent on intertemporal parameters such as the rate of time preference,
discount rate, and interest elasticity of savings (or intertemporal elasticity of substitution). This
criticism merely emphasizes the importance of conducting sensitivity analyses. Furthermore,
annual-horizon models still generate results that are sensitive to choices of other substitution
elasticities. They only avoid sensitivity to intertemporal parameters by ignoring intertemporal
effects. Thus they are unable to shed light on the dynamic effects of policies.
In summary, lifetime tax incidence can play a valuable role in policymaking, as long as
it is viewed as a supplement to, and not a replacement for, annual tax incidence calculations.
The particular analysis described in this paper could easily be simplified in order to avoid
general equilibrium price calculations and utility-based welfare measures. Alternatively, it could30
be madej]Q complicatedin order to account for imperfect capital markets, liquidity
constraints, endogenous bequests,or other phenomena. Either way, our purposehereis just to
emphasizethe basic distinction providedby the lifetime framework --themeasurement of
lifetimetax burdens with respect tolifetimeabilitiesto pay taxes.
VU.CONCLUSION
The lifetime tax incidence model described in this paper provides new insights into the
long-run effects of consumption or wage taxation. Our simulation results highlight the tradeoffs
between efficiency and equity in the debate about the choice between income-based and
consumption-based taxes.For example, intertemporal efficiency is greatly improved by
replacing the personal income tax with a consumption or wage tax, but such a switch is lifetime
regressive in nature. A switch from either sales and excise taxes or payroll taxes to a uniform
consumption tax is a progressive reform, but generates a much smaller efficiency gain. Our
results suggest that the removal of the 1984 version of the corporate income tax provided the
largest gain in relation to the small bit of revenue lost. For this tax switch, our distributional
results are somewhat surprising. The corporate tax replacement would be slightly progressive
in nature, because the corporate tax applied at higher effective rates to goods consumed by low-
income families.
While the concept of lifetime tax incidence is widely accepted within the academic
community, it has yet to be fully implemented by government tax-analysis agencies. We have
attempted in this paper to respond to some of the criticisms of the lifetime approach, as voiced
by government economists, but further efforts are needed to bridge the current gap between the
rather stylized, academic analysis presented in this paper and the data-intensive types of studies
undertaken by policy economists.Only then will the lifetime framework be routinely














Wage Profiles for Selected Groups












20 30 40 50 60 70 80
AgeFigure 3

































Gains and Losses to Each Generation
When a Consumption Tax Replaces Each U.S. Tax
(AllIncomeGroups,StandardParameters)








-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80
Cohort (yearofbirth)'Fable 1
Welfare Effects of a Uniform Consumption Tax, Replacing Each U.S. Tax, whit Standard Parameters
=.5,=.005)
EVas%ofLifetime income, for Steady-StaleGenerations
Lifetime Sales & Entire
Income Personal Excise Payroll Property Corporate Tax
Category Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes System
-5.09 1.70 0.73 0.60 1.14 -2.00
2 -0.34 1.27 0.48 0.55 0.89 3.19
3 -0.70 1.22 0.54 0,2! 0.78 2.48
4 0.71 1.16 0.55 0.33 0.81 3.94
5 2.53 1.19 0.64 0.09 0.78 5.66
6 0.66 1.11 0.6! 0.19 0.77 3.74
7 2.22 1.04 0,53 0.59 0.85 5.64
8 2.43 1.08 0.6.5 0.14 0.76 5.47
9 3.01 1.06 0.67 0.17 0.77 6.09
10 3.04 0.98 0.55 0.16 0.74 5.83
1! 4.19 0.72 0.16 0.73 0.83 6.81
12 9.11 0.60 0.01 1.08 0.93 11.87
All Twelve in Steady State:
as % of Lifetime Income 2.57 1.02 0.50 0.36 0.80 5.58
as % of Revenue 20.88 10.32 8.86 11.58 314.63 17.62
All generations:
as % of PV(Lifetime Income) 0.66 0.18 0.05 0.17 0.25 1.25
as % of PV(Revenue) 5.10 1.76 0.80 5.04 84.14 3.75Table 2
WelfareEffecis of a Uniform ConstiniptiouiTax,Replacing Each U.S.Tax,withAlternativeParameters
=.25, ?i = -.005)
EVas % of Lifetime income, for Steady-State Generations
Lifetime Sales & Entire
Income Personal Excise Payroll Property Corporate Tax
Category Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes System
-5.58 2.01 1.05 0.64 1.34 -2.85
2 -0.79 1.29 0.50 0.37 0.83 2,56
3 -1.38 1.27 0.61 -0.11 0.69 1.49
4 0.09 1.21 0.61 0.03 0.73 3.03
5 1.76 1.26 0.72 -0.31 0.66 4.53
6 -0.06 1.17 0.69 -0.17 0.67 2.7!
7 1.80 1.06 0.56 0.41 0.80 5.07
8 1.62 1.14 0.73 -0.24 0.65 4.31
9 2.24 1.13 0.75 -0.21 0.67 4.99
10 2.28 1.04 0.63 -0.20 0.64 4.71
11 3.91 0.72 0.17 0.65 0.79 6.36
12 9.11 0.57 -0.02 1.16 0.93 11.82
All twelve in steady state:
as % of Lifetime Income 1.96 1.06 0.55 0.09 0.72 4.71
as % of Revenue 15.83 10.84 9.94 2.74 214.22 14.75
All generations:
as % of PV(Lifetime Incomes) 0.42 0. 18 0.06 0.07 0.22 0.86
as % of PV(Revenues) 3.22 1.78 1.02 1.97 54.84 2.54i'ablc 3
Welfare EFfects of a Uniform Wage Tax, Replacing Each U.S. Tax, with Standard Parameters
.5, b = .005)
EV as % of lifetime Income, for Steady-State Generations
Lifetime Sales& Entire
Income Personal Excise Payroll Property Corporate Tax
Category Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes System
1 -6.21 1.19 0.39 0.36 1.12 -5.86
2 -1.47 0.62 0.08 0.27 0.87 -0.80
3 -1.96 0.39 0.06 -0.11 0.76 -1.97
4 -0.55 0.33 0.07 -0.00 0.79 -0.53
5 1.15 0.19 0.07 -0.28 0.75 0.80
6 -0.69 0.15 0.07 -0.17 0.74 -1.03
7 1.01 0.22 0.07 0.27 0.83 1.32
8 0.97 0.02 0.0 -0.24 0.73 0.36
9 1.56 -0.02 0,07 -0.22 0.75 0.96
10 1.81 0.10 0.06 -0.16 0.72 1.43
11 3.77 0.59 0.06 0.62 0.82 5.00
12 9.03 0.75 0.08 1.06 0.94 11.12
All Twelvein Steady Slate:
as % ofLifetimeIncome 1.43 0.26 0.07 0.07 0.78 1.53
as %of Revenue 6.54 1.29 0.65 1.14 162.55 2.26
Allgenerations:
as 96 of PV(Lifetime Income) 0.60 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.25 0.93
as % of PV(Revenue) 2.59 0.66 0.19 2.26 44.14 1.31Table 4
Welfare Effects of a Uniform Wage Tax, Replacing Each U.S. Tax, with Alternative Parameters
.25, 6 = -.005)
LW as % of Lifetime Income, for Steady-State Generations
Lifetime Sales & Entire
Income Personal Excise Payroll Property Corporate Tax
Category Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes 'Faxes System
1 -6.80 1.42 0.66 0.38 1.31 -6.78
2 -1.96 0.59 0.08 0.07 0.81 -1.42
3 -2.75 0.33 0.05 -0.46 0.66 -3.12
4 -1,28 0.27 0.06 -0.33 0.69 -1.64
5 0.26 0. 11 0.06 -0.72 0.62 -0.55
6 -1.53 0.08 0.06 -0.56 0.63 -2.28
7 0.55 0.19 0.07 0.06 0.77 0.73
8 0.03 -0.05 0.05 -0.66 0.60 -1.05
9 0.65 -0.09 0.06 -0.64 0.62 -0.37
10 0.94 0.03 0.05 -0.56 0.60 0.16
11 3.54 0.59 0.06 0.56 0.79 5.01
12 9.19 0.80 0.08 1.17 0.95 11.75
Alltwelve in steady state:
as % of Lifetime Income 0.77 0.22 0.06 -0.23 0.69 0.63
as% of Revenue 3.46 1.05 0.60 -3.72 105.67 0.92
Allgenerations:
as % of PV(Lifetime Incomes) 0.34 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.22 0.56
as % of PV(Revenues) 1.47 0.55 0.18 0.55 27.85 0.78Table 5
TaxRates ForEachReplacenicuit,with Standard I'nraatclers
= .5, 6 = .005)
ConsumptionTax Rate Wage Tax Rate
Steady Stale
Removal Of: First Period Steady State
Personal Taxes . 1422 . 1237 . 1590 . 1524
.1457
Sales& Excise Tax .1104 .1073 .1469
Payroll Taxes .0642 .0627 .0741
.0414
Property Taxes .0384 .0328
.0034
Corporate Taxes .0058 .0026
.4718
Entire Tax System .4425 .3686 .47 -
First PeriodREFERENCES
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